Recent advances in information technologies create numerous opportunities for retailers to turn customer information into additional profits by targeted pricing: charging different prices to different market segments based on customer demographic variables. However, rigorous theoretical analysis regarding what is the profit-maximizing set of variables remains scarce. This study develops a game-theoretic model to investigate this question. This paper starts the analysis with a benchmarking monopoly case. Results of this model suggest that a monopoly seller should use pricing variables with high explanatory power of its own demand:
Introduction
Modern business intelligence software can rank customers and prioritize the best segments based on customer characteristics. Firms have begun including targeted messaging on webpages, e-mails, and catalogues with a customer's preferred products and special offers based on various customer characteristics. In a recent Yankee Group survey, 48 percent of the 456 respondents said they currently use technology to manage pricing. Meanwhile, 25 percent plan to buy technology in the next 12 months to provide customer-specific pricing electronically. This is because pricing software 1 Huang: Equilibrium M arket Segm entation for Targeted Pricing Based on C ustom er C haracteristics 2 Article submitted to M anagem ent Science; manuscript no. MS-XXXX-XXXX.XX generates an impressive ROI, typically 5 to 19 percent profit improvement (source: www.cio.com).
In stark contrast, there is a scarcity of rigorous theoretical analysis regarding the optimal and equilibrium set of demographic variables sellers should use for pricing and market segmentation.
When it is unclear which set of demographic variables the sellers should use to create market segments, efforts to reach customers and improve customer profitability will fall flat.
This paper attempts to investigate the pricing variables selection problem by answering the following research questions: (1) How should firm(s) choose pricing variables in a monopoly or duopoly? Equivalently, what is the criterion for selecting variables? (2) When a firm's competitor uses the same pricing variable, is its equilibrium profit higher or lower? Equivalently, should competitors mimic each other's pricing strategy? (3) Is the equilibrium selection of variables different when two firms sell complements rather than substitutes? (4) Do firms selling high quality products prefer using more pricing variables in the equilibrium?
From a practical viewpoint, the selection of pricing variables is important. Without a thorough understanding of the underlying tradeoffs of using uniform pricing versus different pricing variables, even dominant players with superior products may lose customers and profits. For example, DHL Worldwide Express Inc. previously followed a typically unscientific approach: it long had a one-pricefits-all model. As a consequence, DHL often scared potential customers away by asking for more than rivals FedEx Corp. and UPS, who has segmented pricing based on routes and weights. In 2001, DHL turned to Web-based pricing tools and began to charge different prices for different routes and weights. The gross margins have jumped 5.4 percentage points. In this example, differential pricing in different market segments is apparently critical for DHL's bottom line. This leaves the following questions to ponder: How did FedEx and UPS decide to use "routes" and "weights" but not other variables? Are there more pricing variables that should be used? What is the equilibrium selection of pricing variables in this industry?
A high-tech version of this story occurs in the enterprise software industry. Enterprise databases have been priced by the number of CPUs of the computer owned by the corporate buyers. At first sight, it is an interesting "customer characteristic" for pricing. It is puzzling why databases are 3 not priced based on the processing power of CPU (such as the IBM Mainframe) or the number of employee (such as the Java Enterprise Systems)? In fact, Oracle, the most powerful database vendor, experimented for two years with licensing based on the total processing power of CPUs, but failed. The Oracle example implies that using per-CPU pricing seems to be an equilibrium since even the most dominant player cannot unilaterally switch to other pricing variables. The present study confirms this. Firms do benefit from using the same variable in this case. But, better equilibria may exist. Specifically, it may be more profitable for all database vendors to use the total processing power of CPUs, but it is not profitable for Oracle to unilaterally change its price variable.
At first sight, this result seems to contradict the intuition that firms can relax price competition by using different pricing variables. This study will address these issues in detail and provide the conditions under which either pricing strategy profile can form an equilibrium.
The pricing variables selection problem has much wider applicability than these two examples, conventional database marketing, or modern targeted coupons. In the Internet era, many innovative pricing structures continue to emerge, and the success of these new pricing plans depends critically on the selection of pricing variables. For example, Online DVD rental firms Netflix and Blockbuster charge users based on the number of DVD rented at the same time or the total number rented in a month. At the same time, they can offer customers different discounts based on other customer characteristics, such as zip code, the movies they like, rental history, and the clickstream. Online brokers, such as eTrade, charge customers based on the number of transactions or the dollaramount of transactions. eBay charges auction sellers by a complicated function of initial and final prices. Rental cars can be charged based on actual mileage, prepaid mileage, or the length of rental time. The same seat on the same flight may be sold from $200 to $1000 based on a variety of factors. Digitized books, music, and movies can be sold based on the number of concurrent users (or computers), the number of times that the file can be used (usage), or the duration of the ownership.
Essentially, the pricing of all products with zero variable cost-or products sold online-involve the selection of pricing variables.
Huang: Equilibrium M arket Segm entation for Targeted Pricing Based on C ustom er C haracteristics 4 Article submitted to M anagem ent Science; manuscript no. MS-XXXX-XXXX.XX
Overview of Model Setup and Results
This paper investigates this problem by using a third-degree price discrimination model.
1 This study models consumer demand using a general linear demand system. Specifically, the demand of each firm is assumed to be a linear combination of pricing variables and prices. No distributional assumption is imposed on the pricing variables except assuming zero correlation between any two variables. The sequence of the game is as follows: risk-neutral duopoly firms first select pricing variables simultaneously and then choose pricing functions simultaneously.
In the benchmarking monopoly case, this model suggests that the optimal pricing plan is a linear function of the pricing variables (a two-part tariff). The additional value of using a pricing variable for price discrimination (abbreviated as VOPD) also has a simple expression with only three factors:
(1) the monopoly power (2) the variance of that variable (3) the coefficient of that variable in the demand function. Interestingly, the VOPD does not depend on the mean of each variable. Therefore, it is optimal for the monopoly seller to use pricing variables with high explanatory power of its own demand: i.e., variables with large coefficients or high variance. This simple yet intuitive criterion can guide marketers to choose a small number of pricing variables from hundreds of potential customer characteristics.
In the duopoly case, this model suggests that the VOPD is the same as that in the monopoly case when only one firm uses that pricing variable. When two symmetric firms use a pricing variable at the same time, the VOPD may be higher or lower. When two firms sell substitutes and the demand is affected by that variable in the opposite direction (defined as Horizontal Pricing Variable), the VOPD is lower. The intuition is similar to the literature in targeted pricing, in which price 1 Second-degree price discrimination occurs when prices differ depending on the number of units of the good bought, but not across consumers Varian (1992) . Third-degree price discrimination means that different purchasers are charged different prices, but each purchaser pays a constant amount for each unit of the good bought Varian (1992) . In some of the motivational examples, buyers can change their pricing variables, which leads to a second-degree price discrimination problem. For example, firms can change the number of employee to save software expenses. However, few firms adopt this strategy in practice. In the extreme, even student status is "adjustable" by getting a fake ID or registering for a class. But, few people do that because of the benefits of student discounts. Hence, results of this papers still apply well in examples in which buyers do not change their characteristics because of the pricing plan. 5 discrimination will trigger price wars in each firm's strong and loyal market segments, leading to lower equilibrium VOPD (named as Cannibalization Effect). In contrast, when the demand is affected by that variable in the same direction (defined as Vertical Pricing Variable), the VOPD is higher. The reason is that using the same pricing variable can better coordinate firms' pricing strategies to relax competition (named as Coordination Effect). When firms sell complements, these effects are reversed. The following two examples illustrate these findings. Example 1. (Cannibalization Effect) There are two firms A and B selling horizontally differentiated products. For example, firm A can be Blockbuster and firm B can be Netflix.com. There are two pricing variables, X 1 and X 2 . Customers are grouped into several market segments based on these two demographic variables. X 1 indicates how far a customer lives from a Blockbuster's store. X 2 indicates whether or not a customer likes to shop online. These two pricing variables are typical examples of Horizontal Pricing Variables, which identify the loyal customers of one firm.
One strength of this model is that no distributional assumption is imposed on X 1 or X 2 . Hence, either variable can be , in turns, a continuous variable or discrete variable with any number of market segments. Only the mean and variance of pricing variables matter. In each market, two sellers locate at the two ends of a straight line [−1, 1] . The utility function of a buyer located at x with demographic values ( x 1 , x 2 ) to buy from each seller is assumed to be
where K is a constant large enough so that every customer buys either from firm A or B, x is the location of that customer and is uniformly distributed in
2 It can be verified that the traveling cost does affect the results and is assumed to be 1/2 for simplicity. Given this setup, it follows that the demand of each firm in each market segment is given by
In the first stage, two firms simultaneously choose pricing variables and next choose pricing in each segment simultaneously. Section 3 shows that the adoption of pricing variables can be determined ONE-BY-ONE. The payoff matrix of using X 1 or X 2 is reported in 
where X 1 is the distance of a package to be delivered and X 2 is the weight of a package. Note that the longer the distance or the heavier the package is, the higher the demand for both firms' services (given the same prices). Both of these variables are examples of Vertical Pricing Variables, which identify the customers who have higher demand for both products. For illustration purpose, cases, it should be more common to observe case 1 (which is the "focal point" in the game theory's terminology).
Position in the Literature
This paper adds to the existing literature in several important aspects. First, for academic researchers, to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the pricing variables selection problem. This research may pave an important approach to investigate the pricing variables selection problem. As information technologies become more prevalent, there will be more innovative pricing variables and more applications of the present research area in the future.
For practitioners, this model may change their pricing strategies for the following reasons. First,
this model provides precise criteria to select pricing variables in the monopoly or duopoly case, which has not been analyzed in either academic journals or business magazines. Second, this model identifies the conditions under which only one firm should use a specific pricing variable in the . This model suggests they should work cooperatively to use the same set of variables to relax price competition.
In practice, the legality issues of "collusion on pricing variable" are interesting research directions but are beyond the scope of this paper.
Third, this paper complements the theoretical research on pricing, particularly in first-degree or third degree price discrimination. This stream of literature in economics started from the seminal articles of Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985) , and has focused only on the welfare implications of price discrimination but not on the variables selection problem. In the marketing literature, researchers have investigated applications of price discrimination based on abstract variables. These marketing studies can be roughly grouped as follows:
1. Personalized Pricing: For example, this stream of literature considers pricing based on the "location of customers" or "brand preference" in a Hotelling spatial model (e.g. Thisse and Vives 1989 , Liu and Serfes 2004 , 2005b , based on the "quality preference" of customers (e.g. Choudhary The focus of these marketing studies is to investigate the impacts of various pricing strategies on the profitability of firms. None of these papers explicitly models more than one pricing variable or investigates the selection of pricing variables. Therefore, the present model can bridge the gap between these marketing models and business practices by identifying the real-world variables that best operationalize theoretical, abstract variables including "customer types", "purchase history", "brand loyalty", "location or taste" in spatial models, and "quality preference" in vertical differentiation models.
Lastly, this paper also adds to the existing literature that studies the value of demand information in a duopoly model (Bertrand-Nash pricing game). When firms use a pricing variable in this study, they can charge different prices in different market segments, which is similar to charging different prices based on the signals of market demand conditions. It has been shown in the seminal work of Vives (1984) that in a duopoly model, if the goods are substitutes, to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in Bertrand competition with known cost structures. If the goods are complements, the result is reversed. Along this line, numerous papers have investigated the conditions under which an oligopolist has an incentive to share private information about a stochastic demand or stochastic costs (e.g. Sakai 1985 , Gal-Or 1985 , Shapiro 1986 , Ziv 1993 , Raith 1996 . Similar approaches have been used to investigate the value of marketing information in Raju and Roy (2000) , sharing cost information for new product pricing in Christen and Sarvary (2005) , information sharing in a supply chain contracting context (e.g. Lee et al. 2000 , Li 2002 , and sharing security information in Gal-Or and Ghose (2005).
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the setup and the results of the baseline model. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium variables selection and its applications. Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
Model
There are two sellers A and B competing in many market segments determined by a set of pric- This study models consumer demand for these two brands using the linear demand system, a model that has been used frequently in the literature. Formally, the demand of buyers with a demographic value vector x ≡ (x 1 , ..., x N ) has the following linear functional form.
where the subscripts of demand and prices denote the seller A and B, α i and β i are exogenous coefficients of variables, and p A (·) and p B (·) are product prices in each market segment. Note that α A and β B are positive and other coefficients can be either positive or negative. Cross price coefficients, α B and β A , are both positive when two products are substitutes and both negative when two products are complements. The absolute values of α B and β A are assumed to be smaller than that of α A and β B . This linear demand system encompasses models with vertical or horizontal differentiation in the literature (Please refer to Section 3 for detail).
For ease of exposition, I use X A and X B to denote the random vectors of pricing variables used by sellers A and B, respectively. In the following analysis, the realizations of X A and X B are denoted by x A and x B . Note that X A and X B can have an empty intersection set or not. For example, X A may include two variables (region, student-status) and X B may include (region, gender).
Both firms are risk neutral and maximize expected profits conditional on the pricing variables.
The variable costs are assumed to be zero to simplify the notations. All of the results still hold with constant variable cost. Given this setup, when firm A uses X A , the expected revenue in each market segment is a function of x A and is given by
Huang 
Monopoly Benchmark Case
This section first solves a monopoly benchmark case. Assuming only firm A serves the whole market, the optimal price and profit are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. When firm A uses variable X A in a monopoly industry, the optimal price and revenue function are given by
There are several important implications from this lemma. First, the optimal pricing function is a linear function of pricing variables, which is chosen among any possible pricing functions. In other words, the seller should use a simple pricing plan: charge customers a fixed fee µ A /2α A and a variable fee α i /2α A . For example, eBay can charge their sellers a fixed listing fee at µ A /2α A . Note that when this monopoly does not adopt any pricing variable, the optimal uniform price is also µ A /2α A . The interpretation of α i /2α A depends on the pricing variable: it is a per-unit fee when "the number of items sold" is the variable, or a percentage (commission) when the final auction price is the pricing variable. Note that this result is built upon the linear demand but not the distribution of pricing variables. The simplicity of the optimal linear pricing has important practical implications. It explains why we do not observe complex pricing schemes in practice. Managers do not have to search for elaborate and complex formulae; instead, they need focus only on finding the optimal values for the variable (commission) and fixed fee. Example 3. Suppose the demand of eBay's service for the seller is given by
where x 1 is the final auction price, µ and σ 2 are the mean and variance of X 1 , respectively. Lemma 1 prescribes that
The optimal fee structure includes two components: a fixed listing fee α 0 /2 and a commission at 5% of the final auction price. Comparing the profit of eBay of using x 1 with the profit of uniform pricing, the additional profit gain is determined by 1 400 Huang: Equilibrium M arket Segm entation for Targeted Pricing B ased on C ustom er C haracteristics Article submitted to M anagem ent Science; manuscript no. MS-XXXX-XXXX.XX 15
Duopoly Results
In the duopoly case, the equilibrium prices are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose α 0 and β 0 are large enough so that no market segment is closed for each firm in the equilibrium. When firms A and B use variables X A and X B , respectively, the equilibrium prices are
where
This lemma indicates that equilibrium prices are still linear functions of pricing variables but now it has three components. The first term is constant. The second term is a linear function of pricing variables used by firm A but not firm B (or the other way around). Note that this term is exactly the same as that in the monopoly case. The third term is a linear function of pricing variables used by both firms. Note that these pricing functions are mean-preserving dispersions along that dimension. For example, suppose only firm A uses X 1 , then firm B is facing an expected
, which is the price charged by firm A when firm A does not use X 1 .
This feature leads to the result that the second component is the same as that in the monopoly case. The following theorem also confirms that this feature leads to the same VOPD when only one firm uses a pricing variable in the duopoly case.
Theorem 1.
When firms A and B use variables X A and X B respectively, the equilibrium revenues are 
Similar to the equilibrium price functions, the first component in the bracket, A 2 1 or B 2 1 , depends on the product differentiation and firm competition but not on the selection of pricing variables.
The second component is α
), which is the VOPD when only one firm uses variable X i . This value is exactly the same as that in the monopoly case. Intuitively, when only one firm uses a variable, the other firm's pricing along that dimension will be the same as shown in Lemma 2. Since the opponent will not react to the pricing policy change, the equilibrium VOPD is the same as that in the monopoly case. The last component represents the VOPD when both firms use X i . The expression of this coefficient depends on several parameters and is more complicated. The next section will discuss special cases and shed more light on this term.
Theorem 1 also suggests that the revenue and cost from pricing based on each variable do not have interaction terms (i.e., there is no multiplicative term of any two variables). In other words, each firm's optimal response can be greatly simplified. This neat property results from the independence assumption and the linear demand. In the first-stage variables-selection game, each firm has to consider 2 N possible variables selections and the payoff matrix is a 2 N -by-2 N matrix. With this property, this game can be decomposed into N 2-by-2 payoff matrices. The general payoff matrix is illustrated in Table 3 . In the following analysis, I shall use the notation (∅, X i ) to denote the equilibrium in which the first element ∅ means firm A does not use X i and the second element X i means firm B uses X i . Table 3 is the main result of this model and will be used several times in the following analysis.
Corollary 1. This 2 N -by-2 N variables selection game is equivalent to N 2-by-2 single variable selection game.
Equilibrium Variables Selection
In the general case presented in the previous section, all combinations of variable selections are possible in the equilibrium. To shed more light on the new research questions, it is necessary to put some restrictions on the parameters. This section considers two cases: (1) the symmetric case and (2) the firm-specific variable case (pricing variables affect only one firm's demand).
Symmetric Case
This paper defines symmetric firms by assuming α i = These symmetric assumptions greatly reduce the complexity of the equilibrium results. By Theorem 1 and Table 3 , there are only three regions of NEs. In this model, one main source of VOPD comes from the variance σ 2 i while the cost of price discrimination is modeled by F i . When the fixed cost is very high (or very low) relative to the benefit, it is a dominant strategy for both firms not to use (or to use) variable X i . The non-trivial scenario has only two subcases and the result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the duopoly pricing variables selection game,
(a) (Coordination Effect) There are two NEs: either (∅, ∅) or (X i , X i ) is an equilibrium when two products are substitutes (α B = β A > 0), and X i is a Vertical Pricing Variable (α i = β i ), or when two products are complements (α B = β A < 0), and X i is a Horizontal Pricing Variable.
Article submitted to M anagem ent Science; manuscript no. MS-XXXX-XXXX.XX (b) (Cannibalization Effect) There are two NEs: either (∅, X i ) or (X i , ∅) is an equilibrium when two products are substitutes (α B = β A > 0), and X i is a Horizontal Pricing Variable (α i = −β i ), or when two products are complements (α B = β A < 0), and X i is a Vertical Pricing Variable.
Cases (1) and (3) are intuitive since F i /σ 2 i measures the cost/benefit ratio in this model. The intuition of (2-a) is as follows: when only firm A uses X i , firm A will raise its price in the strong market. If firm B does not use X i , it will keep its price at the original level, which will drag down firm A's price because of product competition. When firm B also uses X i , firm B will also raise its price in firm A's strong market, which will further elevate firm A's equilibrium price in the strong market because these two products are substitutes. As a result, the equilibrium prices will be more dispersed when both firms use X i compared with the case in which only firm A uses X i . Since the revenue is a quadratic function of equilibrium prices, the more dispersed the price is, the higher the equilibrium revenue is. 5 In other words, this type of variable can coordinate the pricing strategy of a duopoly. Using this type of pricing variable simultaneously, a duopoly will raise prices in a profitable market and lower prices in a non-profitable market. The gain in the profitable market will dominate the loss in the weak market, leading to higher equilibrium revenue. For example, suppose two firms identify a market segment that is very lucrative (such as there is a football game in town during the weekend). If only firm A raises prices during the weekend, firm A cannot improve profits significantly because of firm B's low price. In the extreme case, firm A may lose all of its customers due to competition. If firm B also raises price during the weekend, both firms can benefit from relaxing competition during the weekend and earn more profits in the equilibrium.
In contrast, when the variable affects demand functions in the opposite direction as in (2-b), firm B will lower its price in firm A's strong market when both firms use X i . As a result, the equilibrium 19 prices will be less dispersed when both firms use X i compared with the case in which only firm A use X i . This intuition is similar to the idea explored in marketing literature-that targeted pricing or coupons at the opponent's loyal customers or market segments may lead to lower equilibrium profits for both firms.
The case of complements is also interesting. The equilibrium effects are reversed because the best response of firms has different directional effects when the other firm raises or lowers prices. For example, when both firms use X i , firm B still raises prices in firm A's strong market segments.
However, the higher prices of firm B put pressure on firm A's pricing because two products are complements (e.g., if the inkjet is already expensive, the printer cannot be too expensive). As a result, the equilibrium price will be lower rather than higher as in the substitutes case. The managerial implication of this case is more important than the underlying economics. Intuitively, sellers of complement goods should benefit from using the same type of pricing variables that can identify market segments with higher demand. Furthermore, practitioners often mimic the pricing strategies of firms selling similar (complementary) products. However, the following example shows that using the same pricing variable on two complement goods usually cannot form an equilibrium. 
where X 1 is a Vertical Pricing Variable (e.g., business customers or student-status) and X 2 is a Horizontal Pricing Variable (e.g., open source activists status). The payoff matrices of X 1 and X 2 are reported in Table 4 and 5, respectively.
Results of this example suggest that two sellers should use X 1 simultaneously only when the fixed cost is very small ( F 1 ≤ σ 2 1 /9). In sharp contrast, two firms should adopt X 2 simultaneously when . In other words, only when F 2 is very large
2 ), two firms should not adopt X 2 simultaneously. 
Firm Specific Variable Case
This section considers the case in which only one firm's demand is affected by a pricing variable.
Formally, this section assumes α i > 0 and β i = 0. Again, by Theorem 1 and Table 3 , the equilibrium results can be derived and are summarized as follows
, the unique NE is (X i , X i ).
(2) Otherwise, the NEs in each region are
], the unique NE is (∅, ∅).
Intuitively, it is highly plausible that only firm A will use the variable in the equilibrium (X i , ∅) since the variable affects only its demand. However, there are many cases in which firm B will also use variable X i when firm A uses X i . The intuition is thus: although X i does not affect firm B's demand directly, firm A's price will affect firm B's demand and hence its best response. When firm A charges different prices in different markets, firm B may also benefit from changing its prices in each market accordingly, which is called "Information Spillover Effect" in this paper. When the Huang: Equilibrium M arket Segm entation for Targeted Pricing B ased on C ustom er C haracteristics Article submitted to M anagem ent Science; manuscript no. MS-XXXX-XXXX.XX 21 fixed cost is small enough, the benefit from Information Spillover Effect dominates and hence firm B will also use that variable in the equilibrium.
Application: Vertical Differentiation
There are two sellers A and B selling products with different quality levels, q A and q B , respectively (q A > q B ). For example, Firm A is Orbitz.com or Expedia.com who offers travel items at regular prices whereas Firms B is Priceline.com or Hotwire.com who offers non-flexible flights, hotels, or rental cars at discounted prices. Consider a simple case with two variables from the consumer purchase history, X 1 and X 2 . X 1 is the frequency with which a customer traveled during the last year. X 2 is the frequency with which a customer used the discounted services provided by Firm B in the past. The utility function of a buyer with demographic values (x 1 , x 2 ) to buy from each seller is assumed to be
where θ models the heterogeneity of customers and is the marginal willingness-to-pay of unit quality.
Consistent with the literature in vertical differentiation, θ is assumed to be uniformly distributed in
In other words, x 1 models the fixed valuation of travel items provided by both firms whereas x 2 models the expected quality preference of customers in each market segment.
Assuming market is partially covered in all realizations of (x 1 , x 2 ), the demand of each seller is given by
Compared with the baseline model, it follows that α 1 = 0, β 1 = 1/q B , α 2 = 1, β 2 = 0, and α A = α B = The NEs regarding X 1 in each region are
, the unique NE is (∅, ∅).
2 , the unique NE is (®, X 1 ).
(
2 , the unique NE is (X 1 , X 1 ).
The NEs regarding X 2 in each region are
First, in the intermediate cases, the high quality firm A will use X 2 and the low quality firm B will use X 1 in this model. This model suggests that when the pricing variable affects only the overall WTP, the lower quality firm has greater incentive to use it. When a pricing variable affects the distribution of quality preferences, the higher quality firm has greater incentive to use it. Although this result comes from the specification of this model, it provides intuitive insights for firms' pricing strategies. For high quality firms, they should focus on using pricing variables related to quality preferences. For low quality firms, customers are more price-sensitive and usually choose between buying low quality products or don't purchase at all. Pricing variables related to the WTP (independent of the quality component) should be more important. Second, when only firm A adopts X 2 , its VOPD is (q A − q B )σ 2 2 /4. This term is increasing in q A and decreasing in q B .
When only firm B adopts
. This term is also increasing in q A and decreasing in q B . The intuition is that the VOPD is determined by the degree of the vertical differentiation (q A − q B ). The larger the difference is, the more product differentiation there is.
Thus, the VOPD is also higher. Note that in the literature, researchers have shown that maximal vertical differentiation leads to higher equilibrium profits, which does not imply the equilibrium VOPD would be higher as well. A contribution of this paper is to show that vertical differentiation can improve the VOPD for both firms.
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Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the pricing variables selection problem for differential pricing based on customer characteristics. In the monopoly case, given any number of potential variables for market segmentation, the seller should use pricing variables with high explanatory power of demand: variables with large demand coefficients or high variance. In the duopoly case, this criterion still applies but the VOPD also depends on the competition. This model shows that when only one firm uses a pricing variable, the VOPD is the same as in the monopoly case. When symmetric firms use a pricing variable, the value of price discrimination is higher when two products are substitutes and that variable affects two demand functions in the same direction. In contrast, the value of price discrimination is lower when two firms sell substitutes and that variable affects demands in the opposite direction. The former effect results from the price coordination effect and the later one results from the cannibalization effect, similar to the targeted couponing effect.
When two firms sell complements, these effects are reversed. This finding has a very important managerial implication. In practice, marketers usually mimic the pricing strategies of their competitors or firms selling similar products. Even when a variable identifies the market segment with high demands for both firms, this paper shows that the sellers should carefully evaluate the benefit when simultaneously adopting that variable: it may create cannibalization effect when firms sell complements. For example, Blockbuster vs. Netflix, Microsoft vs. Oracle, or DHL vs. UPS are, in each case, obviously competitors selling substitutes. They will benefit from pricing by the same set of variables. In contrast, there are many examples of complements for which marketers may adopt similar pricing strategies in practice. This list includes travel items such as flights, hotels, and rental cars; software and its add-on products or services; eBay and PayPal; online retailers and UPS and DHL; online brokers and online banking; credit card and credit report services. Sellers of this non-exhaustive list should pay attention to the cost and benefit analysis when using the same pricing variable for market segmentation since the cannibalization effect is shown to be detrimental in these cases. Suppose the monopoly chooses to use X 1 , ..., X m for market segmentation and denote this vector of variables by X A . When the seller chooses its pricing in each market segment, the value of X A is known whereas the value of the other pricing variables are unknown. For those variables not used by this seller, the demand's intercept will be determined by the expected values, µ i s, of those variables. Therefore, the expected demand curve of this monopoly seller in each market segment (x 1 , ..., x m ) is given by
The objective function is simply
The first order condition yields
The optimal price in the main text is derived after rearranging terms. The first order condition also implies
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As a result, it follows that in each segment the revenue is given by
Taking expectation over (X 1 , ..., X m ) and noting that only the squared terms, E[(X i − µ i ) 2 ] , are nonzero because E[(X i − µ i )] = 0 and E £ (X i − µ i )(X j − µ j ) ¤ = 0, ∀i 6 = j. As a result, the total revenue when using x A is given by
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2
The first order condition leads to
The first term is simply the expected demand over the variables that are not used by firm A. I use the subscript X i∈A C for expectations over X i∈A C . The set A C denotes the complement of set A and thus is the set of variables not used by firm A. The expected demand and the F.O.C. can be rewritten as
Similarly, the first order condition from firm B's profit optimization problem is given by
Note that the expectations are taken only on set B\A and A\B in (6) and (7), respectively. B\A means the set of variables used by firm B but not by firm A. In other words, both expected price functions are functions of x A∩B . The next step is to derive this function. Taking expectations of both sides with respect to X A\B and X B\A and noting that this step does not affect the expected price functions, it follows that
Equivalently, we can use µ A and µ B to simplify the LHS of these equations and it follows that
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Solving these two linear equations yields
E X i∈A C [p B (X B )] = 2α A µ B + β A µ A + P i∈A∩B (2α A β i + β A α i )(x i − µ i ) 4α A β B − α B β A .
After inserting these two expected prices into (6) and (7), we have
This lemma establishes after combining terms.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 1
The first order conditions lead to
which is equivalent to
Similarly,
Substituting for the expected demands in the objective functions, it follows that
Similar to the proof of the monopoly case, note that only the squared term of p A (X A ) 2 will be nonzero because E[(X i − µ i )] = 0 and E £ (X i − µ i )(X j − µ j ) ¤ = 0, ∀i 6 = j. The results of equilibrium revenue can be established after taking expectation on R A (X A ) and R B (X B ), respectively.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2
By Theorem 1 and α i = ±β i , α A = β B , and α B = β A , we can derive the VOPDs as follows Given these values, the proposition can be established.
